11/11/07: DIU IN THE MORNING VISIT DIU FORT, ST PAUL CHURCH.
LATER ON RELAX AT THE BEACH.
OVER NIGHT RADHIKA BEACH RESORT / DIU

11/11/2007 Zondag

Als je blauwe plekken zou kunnen krijgen door intensief gebruik te maken
van je spieren,dan zou ik blauwe kuiten hebben.
De 3000 treden (Volgens India Guide 3000, volgens de Lonely Planet 3572),
komen bij ons beide hard aan.
Daarom ga ik alleen naar het fort op Diu.
Het is een erg groot fort waar maar weinig terug te vinden is
van het Portugese verleden.
Druk is het er vandaag zeker.
Bij het kerkje staan restanten van grafzerken en monumenten.
Maar je kunt alleen over de muur kijken,
het is afgesloten voor bezoekers.
In het fort heb ik een gesprek met iemand die les geeft
aan de universiteit van Rajkot.
Zijn vriend is bankbediende.
Als hobby bezoeken ze belangrijke plaatsen in India.
Per motor.

Vervolgens wordt ik aangesproken door een groep jonge mannen.
Ze komen uit Gondal en hadden mij en L. daar gezien.
Ze vroegen of ik dat geweest was.

Na het bezoek aan het fort: de kerken.
Er staan 3 grote witte kerken die je vanaf het fort
duidelijk boven alles ziet uitsteken.
Ik ga eerst naar de Thomaskerk.
Deze kerk is nu in gebruik als museum.
Ik mag maar een deel van de kerk in
want de vloer wordt schoongemaakt.

Dan bezoek ik de St. Paul’s.
Deze kerk is nog in gebruik.
Typisch Portugese facade.
Het St. Franciscusklooster en bijbehorende kerk
is nu in gebruik als ziekenhuis.
Na de kerken bezoek ik de kleine markt.
Ik koop er een kaart om later de fooi
voor onze chauffeur bij te kunnen stoppen.
Vervolgens rijden we langs een aantal grotten en een waterval
(zonder water) en gaan we nog naar twee uitzichtpunten.
Bij een van deze staat een monument voor de bemanning
van een marineschip (replica van 3 tot 4 meter is er te zien bij dit monument)
dat gezonken is in 1971 in de India-Pakistaanse oorlog
voor de kust van Diu.
Volgens Manu (onze gids) wordt het vandaag vanaf 17:00 uur nog drukker.
De mensen die volgende week 5 dagen vrij hebben,
komen dan naar het eiland.

Toen we terug in het hotel wilden gaan lunchen
zat het restaurant helemaal vol.
We hebben het eten maar op de kamer laten komen.

Nu een fresh lime soda en dan wandelen.Morgen vliegen we om 15:15 uur naar Mumbai,

Althans dat zegt het schema.
Vandaag is de vlucht al twee keer vervroegd.
De vlucht DIU-Rajkot-Mumbai gaat 1 maal per dag.
Het is ook de enigste vlucht op Diu.
Eerste melding: de vlucht gaat om 14:30 uur.
Dat was ook onze waarneming.
Het hotel is heel dicht tegen de luchthaven.
Tweede melding (net voor het internetten)
de vlucht gaat om 14:00 uur.
Morgenochtend om 10:00 uur is er nogmaals contact met
de reisorganisatie en het vliegveld/Jetair voor de definitieve tijd.

Dat het erg druk is werd weer eens duidelijk bij het eten.
We hadden een tafel gereserveerd.
Maar dat betekent nog niet dat er ook tijd voor ons in de keuken was.
We zijn, ondanks de reservering, 1 uur bij het restaurant binnen geweest.
Dat is een duurrecord voor deze vakantie,
De bovenetage van het restaurant was voor de gelegenheid
ook in gebruik.
Stoelen waren niet aan te dragen.
We hadden een tafel met 4 stoelen maar dat ging al snel naar via 3 naar 2.
Hier en daar zaten heren die al iets te veel van het bier ophadden.
De groepen waren zo mogelijk nog groter dan gisteren.

Met kinderen van alle leeftijden. BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR – Volume 4(3) November-December 2001

Loss of the INS Khukri

B Harry

The sinking of the INS Khukri which was the only warship ever lost
by the Indian Navy continues to haunt
the minds of naval war planners even today.
Perhaps there was a certain amount of overconfidence
that crept into the psyche of the Indian Navy
after the sinking of the Pakistani submarine Ghazi
and the devastating attacks on Karachi,
which may have played a major part in the events that lead
to the loss of the ill fated Type 14 ASW Frigate.
This was the only instance where the otherwise highly effective planning
and tactics of the Indian Navy like those used to sink the Ghazi
and for the Karachi attacks, did not come into play.
The Pakistan Navy’s strength was in their latest Daphne class submarines
recently acquired from France, of which there were 3 operational
during the war.
The deal for the submarines was signed on 25 February, 1966
and was funded by the United States.
The first Daphne, PNS Hangor, was commissioned on December 1, 1969,
the second, PNS Shushuk on 12 January 1970
and the third, PNS Mangroon 5 August 1970.
Hangor and Shushuk arrived in Karachi on December 20
while Mangro arrived a little later due to it’s Bengali crewmen,
especially technical officers abandoning the submarine
while it was commissioning at Toulon following the atrocities by Pakistan
against their people.
The Daphne class submarines enjoyed sensors and armament
superior to anything in the Indian Navy’s inventory.
Hangor sailed from Karachi on November 22 for a patrol
off the Saurashtra coast.
On December 1, she was ordered to shift to the area off Bombay
to relieve her sister submarine Mangro,
who was completing her patrol.

Immediately after Pakistan initiated the war on December 3,
systematic attempts to intercept the Pakistan Navy’s shore
to submarine broadcasts were commenced.
This yielded a series of D/F positions of Pakistani submarines
transmitting messages to Karachi.
D/F intercepts were obtained on December 7/8
in an area Southwest of the Diu Head,
which were classified as a submarine transmission.
The war room at Delhi flashed the bearing cuts of these intercepts
which were originating 35 miles South-West of the Diu head,
to the Maritime operations room in Bombay.
Since Diu was the assembly area for ships to be deployed
for missile attacks on Karachi, this submarine threat was causing much concern.
The 14th Frigate squadron comprising of the vessels Khukri,
Kirpan and Kuthar had sailed with the western fleet on December 2.
However, Kuthar had suffered a boiler room explosion
on December 4 and was towed back to Bombay by the Kirpan for repair.
Enroute to Bombay, at midday on December 5, Khukri carried out
an attack on a submarine contact
and transmitted the information back to Bombay.
The first mistake was the decision to deploy the 14th Frigate squadron
for the Hunter-Killer operation which required the old frigates
to prosecute the contact in an area 55 miles by 50 miles South-West of Diu
and on a datum which was already 24 hours late
and in sea state 4.
Despite the fact that the sonar range of the Daphnei
s nearly twice that of the Type 14 frigates,
the two frigates sailed out on December 8 without any support
from any ASW aircraft to commence the Hunter-killer operation.
A wiser choice would have been perhaps, the newer and much more capable
Petya class submarine chasers and/or the newly acquired
Seaking ASW helicopters which were deployed elsewhere
or at least the Talwar class frigates with slightly better sensors
though it must be noted that the Khukri and the Kirpan
were the only ships along with a few Sea kings available for the task.
Although, the odds were heavily in favor of the submarine,
the Indian navy refused to let it threaten them at their doorstep
and the operation was commenced South of Kathiwar in Gujarat on December 9.
Hangor picked up 2 contacts on her passive sonar at extreme range
on a northeasterly bearing, in the early hours of the morning
of December 9 when she was off the Kathiawar coast.
When they were identified as warships from their sonar transmissions,
the submarine began pursuit.
When the first attempt to intercept the ships failed,
Hangor began snorkeling to increase speed.
By the evening on December 9, she was able to make out the pattern
of their movement by tracking them with her advanced sensors
and concluded that the ships were carrying out a rectangular
anti-submarine search.
By forecasting their movement, the submarine succeeded by 1900 hrs,
in taking up a tactically advantageous position
in the path of the patrolling frigates.
The linear path followed by the frigates covering a rather small area
was the second mistake.
The range of the frigates that were moving at a speed of 12 knots
was now closing and the Hangor prepared for the attack.
At 1915 hrs, she went into action stations and 15 minutes later,
came up to periscope depth but could see nothing
due to the ships being completely darkened
though her periscope radar indicated a range of just 9800 meters.
The Commanding officer decided to go down to a depth of 55 meters
and make a sonar approach for the final phase of attack.
The Khukri was still not aware of the submarine’s presence
and continued doing slow speed on a steady course
on a narrow weave which was a flagrant violation
of the anti-submarine doctrine.
The reason for this was the attachment of a special device
by the Khukri’s electrical officer, Lt. V.K Jain,
to the Type 14’s 170/174 sonar to slightly increase it’s detection range.
This new device developed with assistance from BARC,
was approved by Admiral Kohli to be embarked in the Khukri.
The Captain of the Khukri made a conscious decision
to do slow speed to increase the range of detection
which was however a violation and the third and final mistake.
Hangor fired a down-the-throat shot with a homing torpedo
at the Northerly ship (Kirpan) at about 1957 hrs
from a depth of 40 meters.
The torpedo however misfired and Kirpan detected the torpedo
going past her and fired her mortars,which after a few salvoes being fired,
became non-operational.
Without losing time, Hangor turned towards the Khukri
which however did not fire it’s noisemakers
in order to prevent the background noise generated by them
from swamping the sonar trying to detect a weak submarine echo.
Hangor fired a second torpedo, which exploded under the Khukri’s oil tanks.
A few minutes later Kirpan returned for an attack
in a course that brought her in line with the submarine.
Hangor fired a third torpedo and immediately turned away
and exited at maximum speed.
Kirpan however broke off, turned and outran the torpedo
which exploded somewhere in the proximity.
According to the Pakistani version, the torpedo exploded
near the stern of the Kirpan, badly damaging it
and putting her out of action though in reality, Kirpan was not scratched
and returned for rescue operations along with the vessel, INS Katchal.
However, it must be noted that here, we are analyzing
the Pakistani version and the Indian version maintains
that both the torpedoes hit the Khukri
and Kirpan only heard the hydrophonic echo and reported detecting
the other torpedo going past her.
Kirpan was faced with a dilemma -should she immediately lower her boats
and rescue the survivors of the Khukri which would leave her vulnerable
to the submarine or should she leave the area,
repair her defective mortars and return with an additional ship
to commence the rescue and hunting operations.
Under the circumstances, Kirpan made the wise choice of doing the latter.
This action however generated some discussions on the ethics
of such tactics for quite some time in Indian navy circles.
As the survivors swam away from the sinking ship,
some of them looked back and saw the ship going down,
and the sea closing over the bridge.
And they saw Captain M.N Mullah seated in the captain’s chair on the bridge,
as the ship went down.
Keeping him company was Lt.Cmdr Joginder Krishen Suri.
Captain Mahendra Nath Mullah, aged 45,
in the highest tradition of the Navy,
preferred to stand by his 18 officers and 176 sailors
who went down with the Khukri.
When Captain Mullah realized that the ship could not be saved,
he gave orders to abandon ship and then directed his second in command,
Lt.Cmdr Suri to cast life boats, rafts and buoys into the sea.
Many of the younger sailors preferred the false security
of the sturdy steel deck under their feet to the unknown dangers
of the black sea.
The Captain himself pushed them into safe waters,
directing them to swim away.
When one of them offered the Captain a lifejacket,
he brushed him away with the words, “Go on, save yourself,
do not worry about me.”
There was no confusion and no panic due to the Captain’s calm
transmitting itself to his men.
Six officers and sixty-one sailors were the sole survivors
left to tell his heroic story.
Captain Mullah was posthumously awarded the Maha Vir Chakra
(equivalent to the Distinguished Service Order)
His colorful personality was not only missed by his young family
but also by a host of friends in the Indian
and a few from the Pakistan Navy such as
the late Admiral H.H. Ahmed and Capt. Afzal Khan
who had been his shipmates in the forties.

Following the sinking, a massive hunt code
named “Operation Falcon”
was launched by the Indian Navy for the killer submarine
with all available ASW vessels, Sea King helicopters
and Alize ASW/Strike aircraft.
The IAF joined in and mounted sustained maritime
reconnaissance operations.
For the next 4 days, all forces were engaged in relentless
and coordinated activity and carried out several depth charge attacks.
At least 2 salvoes of the numerous charges fired
were confirmed to detonate somewhere near the Hangor
but only to slightly shake the submarine.
Hangor remained deep and crept away at a low submerged speed
to avoid detection.
She could signal her success to Karachi only a few days later.
During this period, one Alize ASW aircraft(piloted by Lt.Cmdr Ashok Roy,
Lt. Sirohi and Aircrewman Vijayan)
failed to return from a mission on December 10,
which involved the investigation of possible warship
and enemy air activity near Jakhau on the Indo-Pak border.
Pakistani records state that the aircraft was shot down
with an AIM-9 sidewinder fired from a PAF F-104
returning from an unsuccessful raid on Okha.
Strangely, this was the only confirmed kill by the feared F-104
for the entire war, which incidentally ended
with the destruction of at least 8 PAF F-104s instead.
Operation falcon was reluctantly terminated at 1900 hrs
on 13 December when the Indian forces were nearing
the range of shore based Pakistani aircraft.
Hangor arrived in Karachi on 18 December
and her commander Tasnim Ahmed was deservedly awarded
a bar to the Sitara- I-Jurat.
However, as always, this incident was subject to severe exaggeration
by the Pakistani side, which was perhaps not satisfied
with this achievement being miniscule,
compared to the Indian Navy operations that led to extremely
heavy losses for Pakistan.
This included the claim of the Khukri sinking with all hands on board,
by the electrical officer of the Hangor, R.A. Qadri
as well the claim of the Kirpan being damaged.
Given the baselessness of such claims,
it dilutes the possibility of the Kirpan being fired at
for the second time at all and it is more probable
that the Khukri was hit by two of the three torpedoes
fired by the Hangor, as reported by the Indian Navy.
Further claims by the former captain of the Hangor,
Tasnim Ahmed, to have disguised his submarine as a “fishing vessel”
when approaching the Bombay coast, merits further analysis.
The Hangor after being upgraded to fire Exocet missiles
along with other subs of her class, continues to operate regularly
with the Pakistan Navy today.
The loss of the Khukri will no doubt be a continuing reminder
to the Navy of the need to meticulously prosecute
a submarine single-mindedly.
A Home was constructed for the sons and widows in record time,
thanks to the generosity of the citizens of Bombay.